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Abstract 
If the Eurozone follows the precedent of the 1930s, it will not survive.  The attractions of escaping 
from the gold standard then were massive and they point to a strategy of devalue and default for 
today’s crisis countries.  A fully-federal Europe with a banking union and a fiscal union is the best 
solution but may be politically infeasible.  However, it may be possible to underpin the Euro by a 
‘Bretton-Woods compromise’ that accepts some retreat from deep economic integration and 
provides greater policy space since exit entails risks of financial crisis that were not present eighty 
years ago. 
JEL Classification: F33; N14 
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Introduction 
The economic crisis in Europe that started in 2008 has been the most serious since the 1930s.  Not 
surprisingly, the experience of that decade can be seen as a guide to the dangers that Europe now 
faces and the policy responses that may be forthcoming.  Looking at the 1930s in this way is not 
reassuring.  That decade not only experienced the Great Depression but it was also a period 
notorious for banking crises, currency wars, exchange controls, protectionism and sovereign default.  
The gold standard collapsed, central banks lost their independence, and the public lost faith in the 
market economy.   
If the 1930s’ debacle were repeated, the prognosis for the Eurozone would be gloomy.  In order to 
assess the likelihood of its collapse and potentially to avert this outcome, it is important to 
understand in some depth the evolution of economic policy and its rationale in the aftermath of the 
shocks that battered the European economy following the Wall Street Crash.  This paper provides 
just such an analysis.  
The legacy of the post-2008 crisis is one of misalignments of real exchange rates, high public debt to 
GDP ratios, a prolonged period of fiscal consolidation, a fragile banking system and levels of real GDP 
appreciably below pre-crisis expectations.  The design of European Monetary Union is revealed as 
fundamentally flawed.  The policy space available to troubled Eurozone economies appears to be 
uncomfortably narrow.  The status quo does not seem to offer a viable future.  Using Rodrik’s 
political trilemma to reconsider the 1940s’ response to the damage done by the 1930s, this paper 
argues that the survival of the Eurozone could be made more likely by some retreat from deep 
economic integration and/or easing the fiscal pain entailed in reasserting strict controls on national 
policy sovereignty. 
1. Economic Disintegration in the 1930s: an Outline 
The Great Depression of the early 1930s was characterized by deflation, slump and financial crises; 
prices declined, there were substantial and prolonged falls in real GDP and unemployment rose 
dramatically while banking and currency crises proliferated.  The responses of policymakers 
comprised a major globalization backlash which entailed greatly increased barriers to international 
trade and capital flows.  Economic policy was very much the domain of the nation state and was 
orientated to domestic needs; attempts at international policy coordination such as the 1933 World 
Economic Conference failed. 
Table 1 records the macroeconomic experience of industrialized countries.  The average decrease in 
real GDP was almost 17 per cent and the 1929 level was not regained until 1936.  While output fell 
sharply in most countries there was a considerable variance – on an annual basis, real GDP fell from 
peak to trough by over 25 per cent in both Germany and the United States but only by about 6 per 
cent in the United Kingdom.  In general, the slump was much worse for countries in which there was 
a banking crisis or which were slow to leave the gold standard.  Experience varied greatly – in the 
United Kingdom there were no bank failures whereas in the United States about 9000 banks 
(accounting for 1/7th of deposits) failed.   A comparison of 1931 with 2007/08 shows that in the 
former year banking-crisis countries accounted for 55.6 percent of world GDP but only 33.5 per cent 
in the latter period (Crafts and Fearon, 2013).   
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The 1930s are rightly notorious for high unemployment but internationally comparable data are 
scarce; the figures in Table 1 are useful for suggesting how rapidly unemployment rose and how 
slowly it fell in the industrial sector but significantly exaggerate overall levels of unemployment.  
Table 1 also reports a steep decline in the volume of trade which fell initially by about 24 per cent 
and never regained its 1929 peak.  Increased barriers to trade played an important role in reducing 
trade volumes.  Models based on import demand functions (Madsen, 2001) and on the historical 
relationship between world production and trade (Irwin, 2012) both suggest that protectionism 
accounted for around 40 per cent of the fall.  The goals of protectionist policies were typically to 
safeguard employment, to improve the balance of payments and to raise prices.  
Table 2 chronicles the collapse of the gold standard in the 1930s.  Famously, the United Kingdom 
made an ignominious exit in September 1931 having returned to gold only 6 years earlier.  Virtually 
all major economies were on gold in 1929 but by late 1936 the French devaluation signalled the final 
demise of an international monetary system based on free convertibility of currencies into gold at a 
fixed parity.  The price of staying on the gold standard was real exchange rate appreciation and 
massive deflationary pressure on prices.  For example, by late 1933 France had experienced a loss of 
competitiveness of almost 30 per cent vis-a-vis the United Kingdom.   
It is also apparent from Table 2 that foreign exchange controls, i.e., restrictions on the international 
capital mobility, became widespread.  The macroeconomic trilemma states that a country can have 
at most two of a fixed exchange rate, independent monetary policy and unrestricted capital mobility 
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004).  Whereas in the 1920s the modal choice was to sacrifice independent 
monetary policy, in the 1930s typically one or both of capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate 
were discarded.  Table 3 shows that there was a strong correlation between abandonment of the 
fixed gold-standard exchange rate and recovery so that, on average, countries seem to have 
benefited from revising their macroeconomic trilemma choice. 
Finally, as Table 4 reports, sovereign default was widespread in the 1930s – much more so than in 
the debt crisis of the 1980s – and was an important part of the world economic crisis and the 
withdrawal of Latin American countries in particular from the world economy.  Debts were owed to 
private bondholders rather than banks and this was important in permitting a relaxed attitude by 
lender governments (Eichengreen and Portes, 1989).   
2. Economic Disintegration in the 1930s: Analysis 
Wolf (2008) performed an econometric analysis of the decision to leave the gold standard.  His 
results were that a country was more likely to leave if its main trading partner did, if it had returned 
to gold at a high parity, if it was a democracy, or if the central bank was independent.  It was less 
likely to leave if it had large gold reserves, less price deflation, and strong banks.  In other words, 
decisions to leave the gold standard were influenced by the strength of worries about loss of 
monetary discipline, the extent of deflationary pain, and deteriorating international 
competitiveness.  The model predicts departures well and indicates that France was under the least 
pressure to exit in the early 1930s.  It also suggests that democratic politics undermined the gold 
standard.   
As Eichengreen (1996) underlined, the extension of the franchise had made acceptance of 
deflationary policies to stay on gold much less acceptable than in the nineteenth century.  For 
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example, this can be clearly seen in the pivotal case of the United Kingdom.  The electorate in the 
1929 election when the Labour Party won 37 per cent of votes and 47 per cent of seats, was 29 
million compared with 7.7 million in 1910.  By the late 1920s, the major parties all recognized that 
unemployment was a key issue (Booth, 1987).  The changed political climate resulted in the 
politicization of monetary policy even after the return to gold and was reflected in the great 
reluctance of the Bank of England to raise interest rates in the 1931 crisis when Bank Rate was only 
increased to 4.5 per cent.1 
For the typical open economy, the big problem as the Depression took hold was deflationary 
pressure as world output and prices fell whilst being severely constrained in policymaking by 
membership of the gold standard.  The macroeconomic trilemma tells us that such a country can 
only have two of a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility and an independent monetary policy.  It 
follows that, for countries on the gold standard, any monetary-policy response to the deflationary 
shocks needed to be coordinated across countries (thereby allowing unchanged interest rate 
differentials) but international coordination was out of the question. 
Besides having no control over monetary policy, staying on the gold standard required reductions in 
prices and money wages to maintain competitiveness, and entailed high real interest rates and 
increases in real labour costs (Newell and Symons, 1988).  The severity and duration of the downturn 
increased the longer a country remained on the gold standard (Bernanke, 1995).  Leaving gold 
delivered autonomy over monetary policy which was conducive to lower interest rates and real 
wage rates.  The collapse of the gold standard clearly triggered a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ currency 
war but nevertheless this delivered global reflation and was part of the solution not part of the 
problem (Eichengreen, 2013).  In the post gold-standard world, central banks tended to lose control 
over the conduct of monetary policy which passed to governments.  Indeed, Goodhart (2010) 
described the1930s to the 1960s as an era of ‘the subservience of central banks’.   
Staying on the gold standard without capital controls increased the risk of a banking crisis as balance 
sheets deteriorated (Accominotti, 2012), although these crises were experienced in many countries 
and were associated with weaknesses in banking systems as well as the deflationary pressures which 
stressed them.  Countries which went through banking crises were exposed to much larger 
decreases in real output; the median banking crisis lasting a year lowered industrial output by 12 per 
cent (Bernanke and Carey, 1996). 
The gold standard collapsed under the pressure of deflation.  This problem stemmed from the 
behaviour of balance-of-payments-surplus countries and the asymmetric requirement for 
adjustment placed on deficit countries.  Irwin (2010) calculated that through their ‘gold hoarding’ 
policies the Federal Reserve and the Banque de France together directly accounted for half the 30 
per cent fall in prices that occurred in 1930 and 1931.  Deflation was accompanied by high real 
interest rates; central bank discount rates averaged 5 per cent as late as the end of 1931 and still 
almost 3.5 per cent in mid-1933. 
                                                          
1
 The UK exit from gold in 1931 can be plausibly be interpreted as a ‘second-generation currency crisis’ when a 
speculative attack was in effect accommodated by the authorities who were unwilling to raise interest rates 
(Eichengreen and Jeanne, 2000). 
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The goals of protectionist policies were typically to safeguard employment, to improve the balance 
of payments and to raise prices. Unlike today, there were no constraints from WTO membership. 
Protectionism is usually thought of as the triumph of special-interest groups but it may have been 
more a substitute for a macroeconomic-policy response.  Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) found that, 
on average, tariffs were higher in countries that stayed on gold longer and so had less scope to use 
monetary or fiscal policies to promote economic recovery.   
Default was typically triggered by the increased burden of debt service as the depression intensified 
and export prices fell while real interest rates rose.  In the 1930s, maintaining debt service tended to 
be associated with fiscal austerity and measures to improve the current account of the balance of 
payments while the decision to suspend payments was often accompanied by fiscal expansion and 
monetary reflation.2  An analysis of the implications of default shows that it promoted growth, 
especially for heavy defaulters (Eichengreen and Portes, 1990). 
This analysis highlights several points relevant to today’s Eurozone crisis.  First, back in the 1930s 
devaluation, perhaps accompanied by default, was the route to recovery.  Macroeconomic-trilemma 
choices were dramatically revised.  Second, the existence of the fixed exchange rate system was 
undermined by surplus countries which placed large burdens of adjustment on economies with weak 
balance of payments positions.  Third, exit from the gold standard was contagious.  Fourth, exposure 
to costly banking crises was intensified by gold-standard membership in a capital-mobile world.  
Fifth, when orthodox macroeconomic policies were unavailable as a way to fight unemployment, 
protectionism was to be expected.   
3. The ‘Cheap Money’ Policy in the United Kingdom 
Leaving the gold standard in September 1931 allowed the UK to develop its so-called ‘cheap money’ 
policy by mid-1932.  This entailed setting Bank Rate at 2 per cent and pushing short-term interest 
rates close to zero.  It is generally agreed that ‘cheap money’ provided a significant conventional 
monetary stimulus which worked through raising investment, especially in house-building 
(Broadberry, 1986), and played a major part in triggering a strong recovery during which real GDP 
grow at almost 4 per cent per year from 1933 to 1937.  The aim was also to deliver ‘unconventional’ 
monetary stimulus once at the interest-rate lower bound (ZLB) by increasing expectations of future 
inflation and thus lowering real interest rates.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the 
objective of raising prices in July 1932 and subsequently reiterated it frequently.  
After leaving gold, control of monetary policy passed to the Treasury and debt management 
considerations took higher priority.  The opportunity to redeem the 5% War Loan was taken in mid-
1932 and £1.92 billion was converted to 3.5% War Loan 1952 thereby saving interest payments of 
£28.8 million annually.  At the same time, the so-called ‘cheap money’ policy became reasonably 
settled and clearly articulated; the Treasury Bill rate fell from 3.77% in the first quarter of 1932 to 
0.60% in the third quarter of that year, a level close to which it remained through 1938 (Howson, 
1975).  Real interest rates fell rapidly (Chadha and Dimsdale, 1999).  The fall in the exchange rate 
                                                          
2
 Maintaining fiscal sustainability is much more onerous when the debt to GDP ratio is high.  To prevent the 
debt to GDP ratio, d, increasing requires that the primary budget surplus/GDP ratio, b > d(i – π – g), where i is 
the nominal interest rate on government debt, π is the rate of inflation and g is the real GDP growth rate.  
Default reduces d, possibly to zero. 
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from $3.80 in March 1932 to $3.28 in December 1932 is consistent with escaping the liquidity trap in 
the ‘Foolproof Way’, as is the large increase in foreign exchange reserves over the next four years 
which reflected government intervention to keep the pound down.3  This strategy was credible given 
that the Treasury was in charge not the Bank of England.4  Cheap money and a rise in the price level 
were clearly in the Treasury’s interests from 1932 as a route to recovery, better fiscal arithmetic, and 
to provide an alternative to the Pandora’s Box of jettisoning balanced-budget orthodoxy and 
adopting Keynesianism. 
The interwar British economy lived under the shadow of a large public debt to GDP ratio, a legacy of 
World War I.  Both price deflation and recession threatened fiscal sustainability; this prompted fiscal 
consolidation in the early 1930s which improved the structural budget surplus/GDP ratio by 4 
percentage points between 1929/30 and 1933/34 (Middleton, 2010).  After peaking in 1933 at 
1.792, worries about a rising public debt to GDP ratio eased and, as Table 5 reports, by 1938 it had 
fallen to 1.438 even though by then rearmament was well under way.   
The stark difference from the period prior to leaving gold is seen in Table 5.  After the falling-price 
years of the early 1930s, the required primary budget surplus fell steeply and, indeed, since the real 
interest rate exceeded the growth rate, it would have been possible to run modest primary budget 
deficits and still have stabilized d.  In fact, primary surpluses continued, albeit smaller relative to 
GDP, through 1938.  A check on the fiscal arithmetic shows that 2/3 of the fall in d during the 
recovery came from primary budget surpluses with 1/3 from the interest rate/growth rate 
differential.5  This experience does, however, highlight that ‘financial repression’ considerably 
reduced the fiscal squeeze required to improve this fiscal indicator.6  It also makes very clear why the 
Treasury liked ‘cheap money’ and its policy to raise the price level was credible. 
This discussion throws up a number of points that bear on policy issues for Eurozone countries.  
First, at the ZLB, price deflation rather than inflation is public enemy number one.  Second, falling 
prices make achieving fiscal sustainability at high public debt to GDP ratios very demanding in terms 
of the required budget surplus so that, if deflation is required to restore competitiveness in a fixed 
exchange rate system, austerity fatigue is a likely consequence.  Third, by the same token, financial 
repression which reduces or even eliminates the need to run a primary budget surplus has major 
political attractions when sovereigns are highly indebted.   
4. The Euro Area 5 Years After the Crisis Started 
                                                          
3 Svensson (2003) suggested that a ‘foolproof’ way to escape the liquidity trap is to combine a price-level 
target path with an initial currency devaluation and a crawling exchange-rate peg which requires a higher price 
level in equilibrium and can be underpinned by creating domestic currency to purchase foreign exchange.  The 
main difficulty is to make a credible commitment that this policy won’t be reversed at the first sign of recovery, 
cf. the Bank of Japan in the 1990s.  
4
 This would not have been the case had the Bank of England run monetary policy.  Governor Norman disliked 
cheap money and regarded it as a temporary expedient (Howson, 1975). 
5
 These proportions are derived using the method proposed by Ali-Abbas et al. (2011), which is an application 
of the fiscal sustainability formula in footnote 2. 
6
 ‘Financial repression’ occurs when governments intervene to gain access to funds at below market interest 
rates typically through moral suasion, regulations imposed on the capital market including imposing obstacles 
to international capital mobility and manipulation of interest rates by a ‘subservient’ central bank. 
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Economic performance in Eurozone countries remains very weak.  Current OECD estimates are that 
for the Euro Area as a whole real GDP in 2014 will still not be below the pre-crisis peak while in the 
worst affected country, Greece, real GDP may be only about 75 per cent of 2007.  Prolonged 
recession has been accompanied by rapidly rising unemployment - from 7.4 per cent in 2007 to a 
predicted 12.3 per cent in 2014 in the Euro Area but with much more dramatic increases in several 
countries including both Greece and Spain where unemployment is predicted to be around 28 per 
cent in 2014.  Price deflation has generally been avoided but inflation remains very low so the 
growth of nominal GDP in the Euro Area is projected to average only about 1.5 per cent per year in 
2013 and 2014. 
Current account positions have adjusted substantially in southern Europe.  By 2012, deficits were 
much smaller so that on the basis of relative unit labour costs only Italy was in a (slightly) weaker 
position than in 1999.  Even so, further improvements in competitiveness are needed to stabilize net 
external debt to GDP ratios or, preferably, to reduce them to less vulnerable levels, say, 35 per cent 
of GDP.  For Portugal and Spain improvements in competitiveness relative to the rest of the Euro 
Area of about 30 per cent are required while for Greece the figure is nearly 80 per cent (Guillemette 
and Turner, 2013).  If this is delivered through falls in domestic wages and prices, many more years 
of high unemployment will have to be endured.  Indeed, Euro-periphery economies appear close to 
downward nominal wage rigidity – only in Greece were labour costs lower in 2012 than in 2008. 
Table 6 reports high public debt to GDP ratios across the Euro Area. The fiscal compact prescribes a 
gross government debt ratio of 60% and that 1/20th of the excess over this level be removed each 
year.  OECD (2013) calculates that to meet this rule Greece will have to maintain a primary budget 
surplus of about 9% of GDP, Italy and Portugal about 6% of GDP, and Ireland and Spain about 3.5% 
of GDP for every year from 2014 to 2023.  If fiscal orthodoxy is the route back to Maastricht, this will 
be very painful.  The 1930s’ precedent says that countries trapped in this position may resort to 
protectionism, for example, through greater reluctance to implement the Single Market in services 
and the creeping protectionism documented by Global Trade Alert (Evenett, 2013).  
Fears of sovereign debt crises have been exacerbated by banking crises which themselves are made 
more serious by sovereign default – the deadly feedback effects of the ‘doom-loop’.  According to 
IMF criteria, there have been systemic banking crises in eight Eurozone economies since 2008 with 
borderline-systemic crises in four more (Laeven and Valencia, 2012).  The threat to public finances 
from financial instability is much greater than in previous generations because bank balance sheets 
are now much larger relative to GDP.  In six countries this ratio was at least 3 by 2009 whereas until 
the 1970s it was typically less than 1 in advanced countries (Obstfeld, 2013).  Equally, the threat to 
financial stability from sovereign default is considerably greater now than in the 1930s because debt 
ratios are generally larger (Table 6) and the debts are owed to banks rather than private 
bondholders.7 
5. The Future of the Eurozone through a Political-Trilemma Lens 
Prima facie, the precedent of the 1930s seems to suggest that the Eurozone will not survive, at least 
in its current scope, since devaluation and default has attractions for the periphery countries of 
                                                          
7
 Relatively low public debt to GDP ratios in the late 1930s reflect lower pre-crisis debt levels, weak automatic 
stabilizers, the absence of fiscal stimulus and the collapse of the gold standard. 
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Southern Europe; this would allow greater policy sovereignty and a route to an early return to 
growth.  These arguments can be articulated in the framework of Rodrik’s political trilemma (Figure 
1), recently used by Crum (2013) to consider the future of the Eurozone.  The trilemma is that it is 
possible to have at most two of deep economic integration, democratic politics and the nation state.  
If a ‘golden straitjacket’ choice is made, then democratic politics is subservient to a rules-based 
system of governance while if ‘global federalism’ is chosen, the nation state loses at least some 
political authority but democracy obtains at the federal level.   
The 1930s’ implosion of the Gold Standard can be understood in these terms. While the ‘golden 
straitjacket’ was acceptable in the context of limited democracy in the 19th century, in the 1930s 
democratic politics at the level of the nation state over-ruled this policy choice.  To retain the 
benefits of deep economic integration required democratic politics at a supranational level but this 
was not feasible.  When reconstruction of the international economy was undertaken at Bretton 
Woods, economic integration was severely restricted by controls on international capital flows.   
The idea of the ’Bretton-Woods Compromise’ was to sacrifice some aspects of economic integration 
to provide sufficient policy space to make saving the remaining aspects (moving back to freer trade) 
politically acceptable.  Capital controls were attractive not only because they allowed independent 
monetary policy but also because they reduced tax competition, which facilitated greater 
expenditure on social transfers, and because they underpinned financial repression which reduced 
the fiscal pain of public debt reduction, cf. the British experience reported in Table 8 where about 60 
per cent of the reduction in the debt ratio of 134.8 percentage points between 1950 and 1970 came 
from the interest rate/growth rate differential.8 
Despite the apparent precedent of the 1930s, the Eurozone has not yet collapsed so this time may 
be different because the benefit/cost ratio of leaving the gold standard was rather different from 
that of exit from the Euro.  First, this may be a Pyrrhic victory because it could well engender capital 
flight and a devastating bank run – or, put differently, ‘the mother of all financial crises’ 
(Eichengreen and Temin, 2013).  Second, in the shadow of the ‘doomloop’, the perception of dire 
consequences of devaluation and default led to the provision of financial support with conditionality 
under the auspices of the Troika.  Third, the European Central Bank has acted as a lender of last 
resort not only to banks but also to sovereigns through sovereign debt purchases and its offer of 
outright monetary transactions (OMT). 
Furthermore, the thrust of policy proposals by the European Commission (2012) is initially to 
strengthen the ‘Golden Straitjacket’ to preserve deep economic integration and the primacy of the 
nation state but at the expense of democracy.  The Commission charts a two-pronged attack on the 
‘doomloop’ with new fiscal rules together with a banking union through a single supervisory 
mechanism (SSM) followed by a single resolution mechanism (SRM).  Crum (2013, p. 615) sees this 
as “‘executive federalism’... a strategy with considerable justification” since ‘democratic (global) 
federalism’ is out of reach and the only realistic alternative is collapse of EMU. 
Yet, European Commission (2012) envisages that these reforms progress to ‘democratic federalism’.  
Later stages of the process would include a full fiscal union and participatory federal democracy 
                                                          
8
 Ali-Abbas et al. (2011) found that, on average, major reductions in the debt ratio during 1945 to 1970 were 
about 70 per cent due to interest rate/growth rate differentials. 
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including direct election of an EU President.  However, given the size of bank balance sheets relative 
to national economies, an effective banking union, which would ensure financial stability and break 
the doom-loop, entails more than the SSM and SRM; it requires a supranational fiscal backstop that 
underpins deposit insurance and provides a financial stability fund (Obstfeld, 2013).  So, ‘executive 
federalism’ may not be enough to save EMU but ‘democratic federalism’ could.  However, voters 
across Europe have very different preferences for design of a reformed EU, i.e., ‘heterogeneity costs’ 
are probably too high to allow the realization of these putative benefits.9 
The economic history of the 1930s says nothing about the feasibility of ‘democratic federalism’ as a 
solution to the political trilemma.  It does, however, both speak to the design of ‘executive 
federalism’ and it signposts a modern equivalent to the ‘Bretton-Woods Compromise’.   
If big primary surpluses are required to achieve fiscal sustainability in democratic countries which 
face high debt to GDP ratios and low nominal GDP growth, history suggests that ‘austerity fatigue’ is 
a real worry and, in some cases, the maximum politically feasible budget surplus may be too small 
(Buiter and Rabhari, 2013).  A different design for the ECB under ‘executive federalism’ may be 
appropriate.  As the 1930s underlines, a key starting point is for the ECB to ensure there is no price 
deflation in the Eurozone.  The experience of monetary policy at the ZLB suggests that the Eurozone 
may be more likely to survive if the ECB credibly targets higher rates of inflation for a period; this 
would also reduce real interest rates and real wages and improve competitiveness in the periphery 
(Schmitt-Groheˊand Uribe, 2013).  Debt relief (a modern alternative to the defaults of the 1930s) 
could also reduce the burden of fiscal consolidation, an undertaking which might entail effective 
monetization of some of the debt by the ECB (Paris and Wyplosz, 2013).10 
It is unlikely that 1950s-style capital controls will be reintroduced on but a modern version of the 
‘Bretton-Woods Compromise’ might seek to facilitate ‘financial repression’ by manipulating the 
interest rates paid on government debt in order to use the interest rate/growth rate differential to 
bear some of the burden of debt reduction, as in 1930s’ Britain.  Although EU rules guarantee free 
movement of capital and the independence of the European Central Bank, countries largely retain 
sovereignty over fiscal and financial matters and that gives them scope for financial repression (van 
Riet, 2013).  Even at the European level, Basel III rules for capital adequacy of banks will privilege 
government bonds as zero risk and EU law allows for capital controls in exceptional circumstances.  
Governments under financial stress may well be granted increased leeway to introduce national 
regulatory actions and moral suasion in support of government debt financing.11   A more radical 
solution, which is probably beyond reach, would be to transform the ECB into a ‘subservient’ central 
bank. 
6. Conclusions 
At face value, the example of the 1930s suggests that for struggling Eurozone economies there are 
big attractions of a strategy of devaluation and default, and exit from the currency union.  These 
                                                          
9
 Spolaore (2013) notes that on measures of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity typically used to proxy for 
‘heterogeneity costs’ the EU countries are not good candidates to form a European federation. 
10
 Their proposal entails purchases of sovereign debt in exchange for perpetual interest-free loans. 
11
 Van Riet (2013) itemizes measures already undertaken that epitomize financial repression, especially in 
distressed Eurozone economies, and discusses the financially repressive implications of new prudential 
regulations and protective measures against market turmoil.   
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potentially include improved competitiveness and circumvention of downward nominal wage 
rigidity, less need to run primary budget surpluses in pursuit of fiscal sustainability and the 
opportunity to implement a new monetary-policy framework.  However, whether exit can be 
achieved without triggering a massive financial crisis is doubtful. 
An option that was not available in the 1930s is major institutional reform to deliver a fully-federal 
Europe with a banking union, a fiscal union and democratic legitimacy.  In principle, this certainly 
could sustain a combination of deep economic integration and democratic politics with the 
implication that the currency union is saved by downsizing the role of the nation state.  
Unfortunately, this requires a level of political agreement across EU member states that is unlikely to 
be achieved. 
To disable the ‘doomloop’, the approach of the European Commission has been to propose a 
banking union and new fiscal rules while initially respecting the primacy of the nation state.  
However, this does not deal with the lack of policy space in southern Europe and may not be enough 
if austerity, stagnation and high unemployment continue.  Here the precedent of the ‘Bretton-
Woods compromise’ has some relevance.  For these countries, different rules of the game with 
regard to financial integration and, in particular, a different sort of central bank would ease the pain.  
An ECB designed to make life easier for the debtors would have a higher inflation target, hold down 
interest rates for longer, and help in eliminating some of the debt overhang.  Obviously, this is not a 
central bank for normal times nor is it a design that Germany could contemplate but in a depressed 
economy with a debt problem it might be more appropriate.  The implicit fault-line within the 
Eurozone is evident. 
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Table 1.  The Great Depression in the Advanced Countries 
 Real GDP Price Level Unemployment (%) Trade Volume 
1929 100.0 100.0 7.2 100.0 
1930 95.2 90.8 14.1 94.8 
1931 89.2 79.9 22.8 89.5 
1932  83.3 73.1 31.4 76.5 
1933 84.3 71.7 29.8 78.4 
1934 89.0 75.3 23.9 79.6 
1935 94.0 77.6 21.9 81.8 
1936 100.6 81.4 18.0 85.7 
1937 105.3 91.5 14.3 97.4 
1938 105.4 90.4 16.5 87.0 
 
Sources: 
Real GDP: Maddison (2010), western European countries plus western offshoots. 
Price Level: League of Nations (1941); data are for wholesale prices, weighted average of 17 
countries. 
Unemployment: Eichengreen and Hatton (1988); data are for industrial unemployment, unweighted 
average of 11 countries. 
Trade volume: Maddison (1985), weighted average of 16 countries. 
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Table 2.  Dates of Changes in Gold Standard Policies 
 Return to Gold Suspension of 
Gold Standard 
Foreign Exchange 
Control 
Devaluation 
Argentina 08/1927 12/1929 10/1931 11/1929 
Australia 04/1925 12/1929  03/1930 
Austria 04/1925 04/1933 10/1931 09/1931 
Belgium 10/1926 03/1935 03/1935 03/1935 
Bolivia 07/1928 09/1931 10/1931 03/1930 
Brazil 01/1927 12/1929 05/1931 12/1929 
Bulgaria 01/1927  10/1931  
Canada 07/1926 10/1931  09/1931 
Chile 01/1926 04/1932 07/1931 04/1932 
Columbia 07/1923 09/1931 09/1931 01/1932 
Costa Rica 10/1922  01/1932 01/1932 
Cuba 06/1919 11/1933 06/1934 04/1933 
Czechoslovakia 04/1926  10/1931 02/1934 
Denmark 01/1927 09/1931 11/1931 09/1931 
Ecuador 08/1927 02/1932 05/1932 06/1932 
El Salvador 01/1920 10/1931 08/1933 10/1931 
Estonia 01/1928 06/1933 11/1931 06/1933 
Finland 01/1926 10/1931  10/1931 
France 08/1926   10/1936 
Germany 09/1924  07/1931  
Greece 05/1928 04/1932 09/1931 04/1932 
Guatemala    04/1933 
Hungary 04/1925  07/1931  
Italy 12/1927  05/1934 10/1936 
Japan 12/1930 12/1931 07/1932 12/1931 
Latvia 08/1922  10/1931  
Netherlands 04/1925 09/1936  09/1936 
Nicaragua 06/1919 11/1931 11/1931 01/1932 
Norway 05/1928 09/1931   
New Zealand 04/1925 09/1931  04/1930 
Panama 06/1919   04/1933 
Paraguay 08/1927  08/1932 11/1929 
Peru 05/1928 05/1932  05/1932 
Poland 10/1927  04/1936 10/1936 
Romania 02/1929  05/1932 07/1935 
Spain   05/1931  
Sweden 04/1924 09/1931  09/1931 
Switzerland 06/1925   09/1936 
United Kingdom 05/1925 09/1931  09/1931 
United States 06/1919 03/1933 03/1933 04/1933 
Uruguay 01/1928 12/1929 09/1931 04/1929 
Yugoslavia 06/1931  10/1931 07/1932 
 
Sources: Bernanke and James (1991); Brown (1940); Wolf and Yousef (2007) 
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Table 3.  Dates of Changes in Gold Standard Policies and Economic Recovery 
 Return to 1929 
Income Level 
Devaluation 
Austria 1939 09/1931 
Belgium 1939 03/1935 
Denmark * 09/1931 
Finland 1934 10/1931 
France 1939 10/1936 
Germany 1935 * 
Greece 1933 04/1932 
Italy 1938 10/1936 
Netherlands 1949 09/1936 
Norway 1932 09/1931 
Spain 1955 * 
Sweden 1934 09/1931 
Switzerland 1946 09/1936 
United Kingdom 1934 09/1931 
United States 1940 04/1933 
 
Notes: real GDP per person never fell below the 1929 level in Denmark, Germany did not devalue 
but by imposing exchange controls effectively left the gold standard in July 1931, Spain was not on 
the gold standard. 
Sources: Bernanke and James (1991); The Maddison Project (2013) 
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Table 4.  Sovereign Debt Defaults, 1929-1938 
Austria 1932 
Bolivia 1931 
Brazil 1931 
Bulgaria 1932 
Chile 1931 
Colombia 1932 
Costa Rica 1937 
Cuba 1933 
Dominican Republic 1931 
Ecuador 1931 
El Salvador 1931 
Germany 1932 
Guatemala 1933 
Hungary 1931 
Nicaragua 1932 
Panama 1932 
Paraguay 1932 
Peru 1931 
Poland 1936 
Romania 1933 
Uruguay 1933 
Yugoslavia 1933 
 
Source: Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007) 
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Table 5.  Fiscal Sustainability Data for United Kingdom, 1925-1938 and 1950-70 
 b i π g b* 
1925-9 average 6.78 4.72 -0.99 2.22 5.85 
1933-8 average 5.04 3.67 1.67 3.59 -2.56 
1950-70 average 2.33 4.17 3.93 2.98 -3.58 
 
Notes: 
The required primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, b*, satisfies the condition that Δd = 0, where 
 Δd = -b + (i – π – g)d.  d fell from 1.633 to 1.584 between 1925 and 1929, from 1.792 to 1.438 
between 1933 and 1938, and from 1.995 to 0.647 between 1950 and 1970.  
Sources: 
b, primary budget surplus to GDP ratio, i, average nominal interest rate on government debt, d, 
public debt to GDP ratio from Middleton (2010) database; π, rate of inflation based on GDP deflator 
from Feinstein (1972); g, 4th quarter real GDP growth rate, from Mitchell et al. (2012) and Feinstein 
(1972).  
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Table 6.  General Government Gross Debt (%GDP) 
 1938 2013 
Austria   35.6   87.3 
Belgium   68.1 104.5 
Denmark   16.5   58.8 
Finland     8.8   66.7 
France   73.0 116.3 
Germany   65.6   85.1 
Greece 119.3 189.2 
Ireland   28.6 126.4 
Italy 114.4 143.9 
Netherlands 117.9   86.9 
Norway   26.2   34.2 
Portugal   75.5 147.3 
Spain   42.4 103.5 
Sweden   20.7   52.0 
United Kingdom 155.1 107.0 
Euro Area   106.9 
 
Notes: data for Austria refer to 1937 and for Spain to 1940. 
Source: IMF (2013) and OECD (2013). 
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Figure 1 
